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In the context of liberalized markets, market outcomes generally result from the strategic interactions of
all market players. Generation company (Genco), as the distributed players, build their subjective
demand evaluations (SDFs) about market for optimal bidding purpose. Due to the differences in terms
of data availability and modeling techniques, subjective demand models held by various Gencos are
heterogeneous and normally deviate from the real market model as well. The picture of a real electricity
market game in Genco’s eye is ‘playing is believing’. Therefore, a question naturally comes to the table:
how those SDFs with the heterogeneous manner impact individual player’s decision and game results. To
answer this question, this paper relaxes a conventional assumption, commonly used in the classical
oligopolistic equilibriummodel, that one correct and uniform demand knowledge is shared by all Gencos.
The results suggest that the system equilibriums would be inﬂuenced by the Gencos’ knowledge about
market demand. The economic value of demand information is assessed regarding the system
performances.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In oligopoly Cournot electricity market games, market players,
e.g. generation companies (Gencos) in this paper, simultaneously
adjust their strategy (i.e. outputs) to increase their proﬁts. The
behaviors of Gencos are normally interpreted as a kind of equilib-
rium-oriented bidding evolution process. The notion of market
equilibrium, e.g. Nash equilibrium, is commonly referred to a sys-
tem state when dynamic interactions approach stable. Modeling
market equilibrium is not only useful for system operator to
monitor market power and assess market rules [1–3] but also
could facilitate Gencos to identify their market power so as to
bid in a reasonable way [1,3].
Many approaches have been proposed with the intention to
model market players’ behaviors and capture the resulting market
equilibrium.
Taking its advantage of simple and ﬂexible modeling, agent-
based automatic learning, as one approach category, is used to sim-
ulate players’ strategy decision making [4–8]. The reinforcement
learning or its varieties are employed by all agents in the repeatedmarket environment to weight predeﬁned discrete actions via a
long-term beneﬁcial function. The system is said to converge if
all players converge to the certain actions with which an optimal
long-term beneﬁciary is assumed to be obtained.
Market equilibrium model, as another promising approach, also
attracts much research interest. In equilibrium model, the rivals’
behaviors are taken into account when on Genco develop its
optimal strategies. When the interactions among Gencos approach
stable it is said system reach the Nash equilibrium. Ref. [9] pro-
poses a binary expansion scheme to ﬁnd the Nash equilibrium in
the short-term electricity markets. Ref. [10] proposes a compact
formulation to ﬁnd all pure Nash equilibriums in a pool-based
electricity market with stochastic demands. Ref. [11] ﬁrstly em-
ploys the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints
(MPEC) to model a single producer’s behavior and then achieves
the equilibrium by solving all MPEC simultaneously in a pool-
based network-constrained electricity market.
However, all those approaches assume that there is one uniform
and accurate market demand function available and shared by all
Gencos. In the realistic electricity market, many stochastic factors,
e.g. weather, demand side features, inﬂuence the real market
demand functions. It is hard to have a commonly agreed function
available for all Gencos. Each Genco has to construct its own mar-
ket demand function, namely subjective demand function or belief
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and its private information. Compared to real market model, in
most cases Gencos more or less have evaluation errors or bias
towards real market demand model, saying subjective demand
error in this paper. Thus, it is important to study how the game will
be changed with those demand errors, in term of, e.g. game equi-
librium, steady state and system performance. The research ques-
tions in this paper are derived from the concerns of practical
electricity market systems.
To our best knowledge, there has been relatively little prior
work in this topic within electricity market system literature.
Ref. [12] analyzes the impact of demand knowledge diversities
on players’ conjecture variation based bidding strategies and pro-
posed a linear data ﬁlter method to alleviate system oscillations
which are caused by such demand evaluation noises in a dynamic
bidding process. Ref. [13] studies the impact of a mis-speciﬁed
demand function on the steady state and the related attraction
basins of a symmetric duopoly system. However, it did not
consider the asymmetric system with heterogeneous players’
behavior, which conform more to the reality.
In this paper, a duopoly game based on the subjective demand
beliefs is set up. Our main result is that the system equilibriums
are indeed inﬂuenced by the Gencos’ knowledge about market.
These inﬂuences are reﬂected by the two facts: ﬁrst the SDFs could
determine if the system equilibriums are local stable; and second if
in the case of stable state the SDFs could change the positions of
system equilibriums. Considering the possible knowledge
deviations in the real electricity markets, the learning strategy by
Gencos such as the adjustment length a in this paper should be
cautiously chosen. By doing so, the unstable state of economic
system and the resulting instabilities of the physical electricity
network can be prevented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 intro-
duces the equilibrium model based on the subjective demand
functions. Section 3 analyzes the stability conditions of the equilib-
riums in the proposed system. In Section 4, the system dynamics
induced by demand errors are analyzed. The ﬁnal section
concludes the paper.2. Genco’s models with subjective demand functions
In this section, we introduce the game models which contain
demand belief errors. For the models without belief errors, one
can refer to the literature such as the work in [14–16]. Note that
in this paper Gencos develop their strategic bidding responses
based on a uniform price market clearing model.Fig. 1. An example of subjective demand beliefs.2.1. Subjective demand beliefs
We assumes that there are a set of Gencos, denoted as I and a
set of loads, denoted as J, dispersed among geographical locations.
The node number is denoted as N. The demand evaluations by
Genco i for the load j at the node n, denoted as f eijn, is represented
by the product of the reference demand of the load j located at
the node n and an error coefﬁcient eijn ð0 < eijn 6 2Þ. Then the
subjective belief of the linear demand function by Genco i is
described as follows:
f eijn : p
e
ijn ¼ eijn  ðarjn  brjn  DjnÞ ¼ eijn  ðarjn  brjn  ðQijn þ Q -ijnÞÞ ð1Þ
where arjn and b
r
jn are the coefﬁcients of the reference demand func-
tion; peijn is the evaluation price about the load j located at the node
n by Genco i; Djn is the demand consumption of the load j at the
node n; Qijn and Q-ijn are, respectively, the supplies by Genco i and
its competitors to the load j at the node n.Since electricity market demands are dispersed among
geographical locations, a vector to denote all subjective demand
beliefs for Genco i at all nodes in system is deﬁned as:
Fei ¼ ½f ei11;    f eijn;    f eIJN 
where I, J and N are the total number of Gencos, loads and nodes.
In this paper, we assume that transmission capacities on all
transmission lines are large enough so that the demand functions
at different nodes can be integrated as one. Thus the node number
is 1. Then the subscript of n and N in (1) can be omitted. Then for
Genco i, its subjective demand function is transferred as:
pei ¼ ei  ðar  br  ðQi þ QiÞÞ ð2Þ
Fig. 1 shows an example about the relation between a reference
demand function and the subjective demand functions held by
different Gencos. In the ﬁgure, the value of the error coefﬁcient, ei,
represents the belief deviation of Genco towards the real demand
function. Being smaller or larger than 1 indicates the cases of
demand underestimation or overestimation respectively; the
correct evaluation is the value 1. In this paper, we only discuss
the cases that the error coefﬁcients are static ones. The stochastic
case is left for the future work.
2.2. Genco’s behavior model with subjective demand beliefs
When Genco i outputs quantity Qi, the production marginal cost
takes the form as follows:
MCi ¼ ci  Qi þ bi
where ciðP 0Þ and biðP 0Þ are the coefﬁcient of the cost curve for
Genco i.
At time t, the proﬁt maximization for a Genco is represented by
the following optimization formula with the quantity Qi,t as the
decision variable:
max Pi;t ¼ pei;t  Qi;t  12 ci  Q2i;t þ bi  Qi;t
 
s:t: Qmini 6 Qi;t 6 Q
max
i
ð3Þ
where Pi,t is the expected proﬁt of Genco i at time t. pei;t is the ex-
pected market price by Genco i at time t, which is an exogenous va-
lue for all Gencos. Qmini and Q
max
i are the upper and lower generation
capacity limits for Genco i.
With the subjective demand functions deﬁned in (2), the ex-
pected marginal proﬁt of the Genco i for time t + 1 is the derivative
of proﬁt calculated by (3) associated to the quantity Qi,t+1:
@Pi;tþ1ðeiÞ
@Qi;tþ1
¼ ei  ar  bi  ci  Qi;tþ1  2  ei  br  Qi;tþ1  ei
 Qei;i;tþ1 ð4Þ
According to the ﬁrst-order optimality condition, when letting the
formula (4) equals to zero, the obtained quantity Qi,t+1 is the
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sented as follows:
Qi;tþ1 ¼ ðei  ar  bi  ei  br  Qei;i;tþ1Þ=ðci þ 2  ei  brÞ ð5Þ
The formula (5) indicates that the optimal quantity is dependent on
both the behaviors of Genco’s rivals Qei;i;tþ1 and Genco’s belief error
about the market demand ei. That is to say the knowledge devia-
tions about the demand would implicitly inﬂuence Genco’s supply
quantities at each bidding time.
Another behavior model is based on the assumption that player
updates its strategy for the coming bidding time using local infor-
mation which is based on the direction of the marginal proﬁts at
the previous bidding time with an adjustment step að0 < a 6 1Þ.
It is also called the bounded rationality [17,18]. Such behaviors
are represented as:
Qi;tþ1 ¼ Qi;t 1þ a 
@Pi;tðeiÞ
@Qi;t
 
ð6Þ
The adjustment step a indicates that speed or step length by which
player adjusts its strategy between two continuous bidding times.
The smaller the value of adjustment step is, the higher possibility
the dynamic system approaches to stable state; and vice versa. In
the following sections, the efforts will be given to reveal the relation
between the system equilibrium stability and the value of a when
the Gencos’ demand belief errors are taken into account.
Both in (4) and (6), the item Qei;i;tþ1 should be evaluated.
Regarding the evaluations about the rivals’ behaviors for the com-
ing bidding time, one simplest principle is that Genco i think that
the rivals will not change their supply quantities, i.e.
Qei;i;tþ1 ¼ Qi;t . This expectation pattern is also called naïve expec-
tation proposed by Cournot in [19].
Thus, the resulting heterogeneous duopoly game in which one
Genco behave as the rule deﬁned by (5) and the other follows
the rule deﬁned by (6) is formulated as follows:
Q1;tþ1 ¼ ðe1  ar  b1  e1  br  Q2;tÞ=ð2  e1  br þ c1Þ ð7:1Þ
Q2;tþ1 ¼ Q2;t  ð1þ a  ðe2  ar  b2  e2  br  Q1;t  2  e2  br
 Q2;t  c2  Q2;tÞÞ ð7:2Þ3. System equilibriums and their stabilities
The equilibriums of the given system (7) are obtained by solving
the ﬁxed points of the dynamical system when setting Qi,t+1 = Qi,t.
The system has two equilibriums indicated as follows:
O1 ¼ b1 þ e1c1
2e1b
r þ c1
;0
 
andTable 1
Cost function of Gencos.
c1,2 ð€/MW2 h) b1,2 ð€/MW h)
Genco1/Genco2 0.025 3
Oo ¼ e1ða
rc2 þ arbre2 þ b2brÞ  b1ð2e2br þ c2Þ
c1c2 þ 2c1e2br þ 2c2e1br þ 3e1e2br
2 ;
e2ðarc1 þ arbre1 þ b1brÞ  b2ð2e1br þ c1Þ
c1c2 þ 2c1e2br þ 2c2e1br þ 3e1e2br
2
 !
ð8ÞThe equilibrium point O1 is not an effective equilibrium since it
means that the Genco2 withdraw from the market at the end. The
effective system equilibrium is the point Oo. The value of Oo shows
that the system equilibrium is not determined by what strategiesare adopted by Genco since the adjustment step a is not included
in the equilibrium Oo, but determined by the Genco’s beliefs about
the demand. The following work in this paper will display how the
system equilibrium is inﬂuenced by the knowledge error of the
Genco.
The local stabilities of equilibriums O1 and Oo are evaluated by
judging the roots of the characteristic equations of the system’s
Jacobian matrix. The Jacobian matrix of the system (7) is developed
as follows:
JðQ1;Q2Þ¼
0  e1br2e1brþc1
aQ2e2br 1aQ2ð2e2br þc2ÞaðQ2ð2e2br þc2Þe2ar þe2brQ1Þ
2
664
3
775
If and only if the magnitudes of eigenvalues of the above matrix at
the certain equilibrium points are less than 1, the equilibriums are
asymptotically stable.
It is proved that the Jacobian matrix associated with the equilib-
rium O1 has two eigenvalues: k1 ¼ 1þ a e1b
rb2þAe1e2brþAe1c2
2e2b
rþc2
 
and
k2 ¼ 0. Since jk1jP 1, the point O1 is not an stable equilibrium of
the system (7).
Regarding to the stability of the equilibrium point Oo, the Jury
stability criterion [20] is employed. If and only if the trace (Tr(J))
and determinant (Det(J)) of the Jacobian matrix J(Oo) satisfy the
relations as following:
1 1
1 1
0 1
2
64
3
75 TrðJÞ
DetðJÞ
 
> 
1
1
1
2
64
3
75 ð9Þ
The region outlined by (9) describes the local stability region of the
equilibrium OO associated to the adjustment step a and the error
coefﬁcients ei(i = 1, 2) when the other system parameters are given.
One numerical example is utilized in this section to show the
impact of demand error coefﬁcients on the stability region. In order
to highlight the impact of demand error, the duopoly game is
designed as such that two Gencos have the identical cost function
data listed in the Table 1.
The reference demand function is shown in Table 2.3.1. Perfect demand belief case
For the given system, if two Gencos have the perfect idea about
the market demand, i.e. belief error coefﬁcients of both Gencos are
1, the stability of the system equilibrium is just determined by the
Genco’s strategic behavior which is represented by the adjustment
factor a e (0, 0.0739]. For this case, one knows one fact that the
strategy adopted by Genco will impact if the dynamic system
would enter the equilibrium state but not determine the system
equilibrium value.
Table 2
Reference demand.
ar ð€/MW h) br ð€/MW2 h)
Reference demand 35 0.018
0.811.21.4
1.61.82
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Stability region
ε2
α
Fig. 2. The stability region deﬁne
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In the Fig. 2, the stability region of the system equilibrium is
outlined in a three-dimensional space, also named error-strategy
(e  a) space. The space underlying the surface is the new stability0
0.5
1
1.5
2
00.20.40.6
ε1 
 in (ε1,ε2, α) space  
d in the error-strategy space.
ε2
α
ε1=0.1
ε1=0.5
ε1=1
ε1=1.5
ε1=2
h different error scenarios
Stability
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
0
0.0739
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
the sampled error-strategy space.
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demand belief since the knowledge deviations of players re-deﬁne
the stability region.
Fig. 3 displays the stability regions projected into the two two-
dimensional spaces. The sampled curves with the different color
represent the error coefﬁcient of 0.1, 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 respectively.
The stability regions in two sub-ﬁgures are labeled by ‘stability’.
The different color lines represent the situations from underesti-
mates to overestimates by a Genco. Now we are going to analyze
the impact of demand belief errors on the stability regions.
Firstly, the comparisons of two sub-ﬁgures show that the belief
errors of Genco1 and Genco2 have the different impacts on the
shape of stability deﬁned by a. It is due to the facts that the two
Gencos have the different behavior patterns. In the left sub-ﬁgure,
the relation between a and e1 is changing with the different error
levels of Genco2. The case when e2 = 0.1 appears special when
comparing to the other four cases. In this case, when e1 is bounded
by a certain value (approximately 0.5), a is available in the full
range. That is to say, when both Gencos (extremely) underestimate
the demand, the system is always stable no matter what the value
of a is. This is because when e2 or e1 is very small the output of two
Gencos are also very small (almost approaching zero in some
cases), the system is always stable since the system is almost static
(no bidding behaviors). However, this situation is not realistic since
Gencos have no motivations to extremely underestimate the
market demand at an unreasonable level. While, for the case that
e2 P 0:5, the situations are different. With the error levels of
Genco2 go higher, the stability ranges of a vs. e1 are shrunk. For
instance, the area surrounded by the red line where e2 = 0.5 is
bigger than the one surrounded by the pink line where e2 = 2. That
is to say that the overestimation by Genco2 would shrink the
stability range of a. While, for the case with a certain value of e2,
the stability range of a would become larger and larger with the
increasement of Genco1’s error levels. So the impacts resulting
from two Gencos’ belief errors on the stability range of a show
the opposite trends.
In the right sub-ﬁgure, ﬁrstly it is seen that stability regions in
the different cases (outlined by the different color lines) keep the
same shape but are placed in the coordinate axis with the slight
differences. Concretely, the stability regions deﬁned in the (e2, a)
space are pushed to left moving with the increasement of Genco1’s
error levels e1. That is to say that the effective range of a is not
much inﬂuenced by the value of e1 but mainly determined by the
value of e2. For the case with the same value of e1, the smaller e2
match the larger range of a; and vice versa. Moreover, for the same
value of a staying in the stability range, the larger the value of e1 is,Fig. 4. System dynamics associatedthe smaller the effective range of e2 is. These observations match
the analyses about the left sub-ﬁgure.
So we can conclude that the stability range of a is more inﬂu-
enced by the Genco2’s belief errors and less by the Genco1’s errors.
It’s logical that since a represents the Genco2’s behavior adjust-
ment, Genco2’s own knowledge about the market would deﬁnitely
impact its behavior adjustment step length and consequently the
stability region of system equilibrium.
The work in this paper reveal one fact that although the system
equilibrium is not dependent on the value of a (the value of a
would determine if the system can enter equilibrium state), but
indeed inﬂuenced by the perception of Genco about the market.
When ignoring such belief errors, the system probably displays
the unexpected dynamic behavior. This observation is ignored by
the previous literatures [20] due to the assumption of perfect
information of player.4. System dynamics induced by demand errors
In this section, we are going to study the system dynamics in-
duced by Gencos’ demand belief errors. The numerical cases shown
in the Tables 1 and 2 are employed here.4.1. System dynamics
In this section, we set the value of a as 0.065 which falls inside
the stability region deﬁned in (0, 0.0739] for the error-free system.
With this value, in the Fig. 4, two sub-ﬁgures separately draw the
bifurcation phenomena of Gencos’ outputs evoked by one demand
belief error while keeping another error coefﬁcient as a ﬁxed value,
e.g. ei,j(i–j) = 0.8, 1, 1.2. Correspondingly, the results in the six cases
are displayed in the two sub-ﬁgures. For instance, the case1 to
case3 represent the bifurcation diagrams of two Gencos associated
to e1 when e2 = 0.8, 1 and 1.2 respectively. The similar settings are
deﬁned for the case4 to case6 just by exchanging e1 and e2. For the
purpose of showing the system performances clearly in the time
scale, the dynamic bidding processes with the given a value and
the different combination scenarios of the certain ei,j(i–j) are,
correspondingly, drawn in the Fig. 5.
Firstly, in the left sub-ﬁgure of the Fig. 4, the comparison of the
three cases shows that from the underestimation to the overesti-
mation by Genco2, the system outputs associated to the increase-
ment of e1 change from stable to unstable. That is to say for the
given a value when the Genco2 underestimates the demand the
system equilibrium can always stay in the stable state. This is alsowith different error scenarios.
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Fig. 5. Dynamic bidding processes in the different error scenarios.
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The bidding processes ﬁnally move towards stabilization after a
couple of oscillations. This phenomenon matches with the facts
depicted in the left ﬁgure of Fig. 3 that when the value a = 0.065
and when e2 = 0.8 the system is stable for every value of e1 within
its effective range. When e2 increases to 1 and 1.2, the chaos take
place for the system equilibrium regarding some e1 values in the
various degree. For instance, when e2 = 1 the chaos or bifurcations
appear with the very small e2 (almost smaller than 0.4); while the
similar phenomenon of chaos occures regarding the larger range of
e1 for the cases with e2 = 1.2. This can also be explained by the left
sub-ﬁgure in the Fig. 3. It is seen that actually the overestimations
by the Genco2 shrink the stability area at the coordination axis of a
and e1.
In the right sub-ﬁgure of the Fig. 4, chaos occurs as well. In the
three cases, the shapes and extent of the bifurcation are very
similar. The larger values of e2 (larger than 1) result in the peri-
od-doubling bifurcations and a cascade of chaos for the subsequent
periodic orbit. The three ﬁgures of the third column in the Fig. 5
display the dynamic bidding processes when e2 = 1.2. It can be seen
that the system can’t enter the stable state no matter what the
value of e1 is since in the left sub-ﬁgure in the Fig. 3 the point
constituted by e2 = 1.2 and a = 0.065 falls outside of the stability
range. Again, the comparisons of two sub-ﬁgures in the Fig. 4
reveal that the stability region is more sensitive to the demand
belief error from the Genco2 (bounded rationality). These
observations validate the analyses about the Fig. 3 from another
perspective.
Moreover, both the gap value |1  ei,j(i,j=1,2,i–j)| and the distance
value |ei  ej| ("i, j = 1, 2, i– j) would inﬂuence the stability of thesystem equilibrium in this numerical case. Logically, the smaller
the gap |1  ei,j| is, the higher possibility the system equilibriums
have to approach the stable. This is straightforwardly seen from
the results in the Fig. 5. Likewise, the smaller the gap value |ei  ej|
is, the higher possibility the system equilibriums have to approach
the stable. The logics behind are that the closer recognitions about
the environment the players have, the higher possibility players
have to reach the equilibrium.
Furthermore, seen from both the Figs. 4 and 5, the overestima-
tions or underestimations of demand would push up or pull down
the output of Gencos in the cases of stable equilibriums compared
to the ones in the error-free situation. The system performances
such as customer surplus and social welfare will be further ana-
lyzed in the following section.
4.2. System performances at subjective equilibrium
In the previous section, it is observed that the system can con-
verge with some error levels, e.g. over- or underestimating demand
by 5%. In such case the stable state of system equilibrium is a kind
of subjective equilibrium (SE) whose existence and value are con-
ditional on Gencos’ demand knowledge perfection degree. In what
follows the system performance in the SE will be studied. The equi-
librium outputs and the associated proﬁts for two Gencos, market
price, and customer surplus are analyzed in the steady state com-
pared to those in the error-free system and are listed in the Table 3
for the given a = 0.065. We check the system results when under-
or over-estimating is 5%, i.e. eli ¼ 0:95 and ehi ¼ 1:05 for i = 1, 2.
The symbol % indicates the difference percentage between
equilibrium proﬁts in the studied cases in this paper to those in
Table 3
The system performances at subjective equilibrium.
Error-free case Single demand error case Multiple demand errors case
e1 = 1
e2 = 1
el1 ¼ 0:95
e2 = 1
eh1 ¼ 1:05
e2 = 1
e1 = 1
el2 ¼ 0:95
e1 = 1
eh2 ¼ 1:05
el1 ¼ 0:95
el2 ¼ 0:95
el1 ¼ 0:95
eh2 ¼ 1:05
eh1 ¼ 1:05
el2 ¼ 0:95
eh1 ¼ 1:05
eh2 ¼ 1:05
Genco1 (best response) q1 (MW h) 405.1 392.9 416.5 408.6 401.7 396.5 389.6 420.2 413.1
Proﬁt ð€/MW h)/% 6219.5 6153.4
1.06%
6275.3
0.9%
6319.0
1.6%
6126.1
1.5%
6252.8
0.54%
6060.0
2.56%
6374.7
2.5%
6181.9
0.6%
Genco2 (bounded rational) q2 (MW h) 405.1 408.6 401.7 392.9 416.5 396.5 420.2 389.6 413.1
Proﬁt ð€/MW h)/% 6219.5 6319.0
1.6%
6126.1
1.5%
6153.4
1.06%
6275.3
0.9%
6252.8
0.54%
6374.7
2.5%
6060.0
2.56%
6181.9
0.6%
Market price ð€/MW h) 20.41 20.57 20.27 20.57 20.27 20.7 20.42 20.42 20.13
Customer Surplus ð€/MW h) 1158.0 1175.5 1141.6 1175.5 1141.6 1193.4 1158.7 1158.7 1125.4
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P0i
%;8i ¼ 1;2;where P0i and P0i are the
equilibrium proﬁts of Genco i in error-free system and error system
respectively.
The data in Table 2 reveals the following facts.
Firstly, in single-error case, at SE, under- or over-estimating
demand by one Genco will accordingly lead its outputs lower or
higher. Correspondingly, its proﬁts are decreased or increased
along with the opposite change of market price; meanwhile the
customer surplus is increased or decreased. It is observed that
another Genco with perfect demand evaluation accordingly raises
or reduces its outputs and its proﬁts are, thereby, raised or
reduced. Especially in the case of underestimation, the correct
Genco beneﬁts from the higher market price induced by the
demand underestimation. The lost proﬁt of the error Gencos
partially go to another Genco and partially go to the customer. In
another word, the system surplus is redistributed among Gencos
and load due to the imperfect demand evaluations by one player.
Secondly, at SE, the outputs and proﬁts of one Genco with a cer-
tain error level are inversely impacted by anther Genco’s demand
evaluation errors. For example, in the cases that e1 is 0.95 and e2
is 0.95, 1 and 1.05 respectively, the outputs and proﬁts of Genco1
display the decreasing trend.
Thirdly, in multiple-error case with the homogeneous demand
error settings, i.e. e1 = e2, one interesting phenomenon is that when
both Gencos simultaneously underestimating demand by 5%, their
proﬁts are increased by 0.54% although their outputs are
decreased. The main reason is that the market price is raised by
their capacity withholding behaviors. Consequently they beneﬁt
from such behaviors induced by their demand underestimations.
If there is no information exchange occurring between two players,
in this situation, the game is played in a tacit collusion manner.
Thus the uncertainties about demand create the possibilities to
collaboratively exercise the market power. It can also be assumed
that in this situation Gencos maybe have no incentives to improve
their demand evaluation precision to approach the real market
function. Moreover Gencos’ collusion behaviors indeed keep the
system staying in a stable state, i.e. SE. Furthermore, in this
situation customer surplus is also higher than the one in error-free
system. By contrast, for the case in which both Gencos overesti-
mate demand by 5%, their proﬁts are lowered due to the fact that
the market price decreases.
Finally, in multiple-error case with the heterogeneous demand
error settings, i.e. e1– e2, due to the symmetry of system and
two Gencos’ errors in spite of in two directions, the efforts to
reduce or raise the market price by those two symmetric errors
seems to be counteracted since the prices in those cases are very
close to the one in the error-free system. By this reason the
customer surplus almost does not change. Each Genco is impacted
by its individual demand evaluation bias in terms of outputs andproﬁts as expected. These observations indicate that the symmet-
rically opposite bias demand errors would result in the redistribu-
tion of proﬁts between two Gencos but not with customer.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, the conventional model of a dynamic Cournot
electricity market game where Gencos are assumed to hold a
uniform and accurate belief towards market is replaced by a more
realistic model with the subjective demand errors. As a conse-
quence, the impact of such inaccurate demand belief from Gencos
on a duopoly game is thoroughly studied. Our results show that the
demand errors will reshape the stability regions of the original
error-free system. Moreover, the stability regions in the proposed
model react differently to Genco behaviors’ variance. This feature
is very important in designing Genco’s adaptive strategy. Finally,
a new equilibrium concept, namely subjective equilibrium,
emerges. The system performances, regarding the equilibrium out-
put, proﬁt and customer surplus, at SE are analyzed.
In this paper, we restricted our analysis to deterministic models
in which the inaccurate demand belief is assumed as ﬁxed along
game iterations. It gives a clear insight on the impact of the
assumptions on the results of the dynamic Cournot game. The fu-
ture work is to extend the analyses to stochastic models in which
players exhibit time-varying belief errors.
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